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Note  
 
If It’s in the Game, Is It in the Game?: Examining 
League-Wide Licensing Agreements After 
American Needle 
Talon Powers*
It was a cloudy morning in 1984 as an Amtrak train made 
its way through the Rocky Mountains on its way to Oakland, 
California. Three men sat deep in discussion in its dining car.
 
1 
The first man, a then 48-year-old John Madden, had recently 
wrapped up a Hall of Fame and Super Bowl winning coaching 
career2 and was transitioning to a role as a “televised NFL 
evangelist.”3 The other two, Trip Hawkins and Joe Ybarra, 
were evangelists in their own right, but instead of advocating 
football through the medium of television, they wanted to con-
nect people to the game through their video game company, 
Electronic Arts.4 While Madden was intrigued by their idea, he 
was only interested if the finished product reflected “real foot-
ball.”5 The drive to get Madden’s approval and get the game 
right drove the creators to make a game that included all of the 
teams and players, in an attempt to simulate the National 
Football League (NFL) as a whole.6
 
*  Copyright © 2013 by Talon Powers. This piece is dedicated to the 
memory of Tamar Hanna Kaplan, an eternal support while writing this and 
the love of my life. Thank you for making me into the person I am today. 
 This drive became Electron-
ic Arts’s rallying cry, inspiring the 1992 company tagline, “If 
 1. Patrick Hruby, The Franchise: The Inside Story of How “Madden 
NFL” Became a Video Game Dynasty, ESPN.COM (Aug. 5, 2010), http://sports 
.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=100805/madden. 
 2. See John Madden, PROFOOTBALLHOF.COM, http://www.profootballhof 
.com/hof/member.aspx?PLAYER_ID=255 (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (providing 
the statistical, historical, and biographical arguments for John Madden’s en-
shrinement in the Pro Football Hall of Fame). 
 3. Hruby, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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it’s in the game, it’s in the game.”7 Madden NFL Football’s un-
questioned success led to a $300 million dollar, five-year exclu-
sive licensing agreement between Electronic Arts and the Na-
tional Football League in 2004, which has subsequently been 
extended to 2013.8
After the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle, 
Inc. v. National Football League in 2010, however, the NFL’s 
ability to license League intellectual property as a collective 
whole has been called into question.
  
9 In his opinion written for 
a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens ruled that be-
cause individual teams have distinct interests in selling their 
team intellectual property, the League cannot be viewed as a 
single entity for the purposes of licensing team logos and mer-
chandise.10 In Section VI of Justice Stevens’s decision, however, 
he identifies some reasons that the League may justifiably act 
collectively in order to achieve certain ends tailored to “[t]he 
special characteristics of this industry.”11
If the case law that emerges from American Needle com-
pletely precludes the League from being treated as a single en-
tity, any licensing agreement of the NFL or other professional 
sports league risks being challenged as a concerted conspiracy 
in restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.
  
12 Applying the Sherman Act to activities taken by the NFL 
in licensing its own intellectual property in the same way it has 
been applied to teams collectively licensing their individual in-
tellectual property would create problems for the NFL’s agree-
ment with Electronic Arts,13 for obtaining essential sponsorship 
money,14
 
 7. Evan Ratliff, Sports Rule!, WIRED.COM (Jan. 2003), http://www.wired 
.com/wired/archive/11.01/sports.html. 
 for professional sports collective bargaining agree-
 8. Hruby, supra note 1. 
 9. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 10. Id. at 2212–13. 
 11. Id. at 2216 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 516 U.S. 231, 252 
(1996)). 
 12. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 13. See Lisa Pike Masteralexis, American Needle v. National Football 
League and the Future of Collective Licensing Agreements in Sport, 19 SPORT 
MKTG. Q. 166, 168 (2010) (arguing that the exclusive licensing agreement be-
tween the NFL and Electronic Arts rests on questionable legal ground after 
American Needle). 
 14. See John A. Fortunato & Shannon E. Martin, American Needle v. 
NFL: Legal and Sponsorship Implications, 9 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 
81 (2010) (concluding that uniform sponsorship agreements may be unlikely in 
a world where each team can argue that it has an inherent right to contract 
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ments more broadly,15 and for every other major professional 
sports league in protecting league interests against players and 
renegade owners.16 While American Needle clearly states that 
the NFL cannot be uniformly treated as a single entity,17 the 
League acts very differently when it packages and sells team 
logos (as in American Needle) than it does when it licenses eve-
ry aspect of the League together in order to create a virtual re-
creation of the League as a whole (as in its license with Elec-
tronic Arts).18
This Note argues that courts should draw a distinction be-
tween licensing agreements that bundle and sell the distinct 
intellectual property of a team and agreements that license the 
intellectual property of the League as a whole. Part I illustrates 
the evolution of the National Football League into a revenue-
sharing organization, establishes the history of the single-
entity defense in antitrust law, and explains the reasoning of 
both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court in deciding 
American Needle. Part II examines how collective licensing 
functions with regard to the League and consumers and uses 
video game licensing to illustrate the difficulties inherent in a 
strict Rule of Reason analysis. Finally, Part III identifies some 
potential solutions and proposes an exemption following Sec-
tion VI of the American Needle decision that would grant sin-
gle-entity treatment to league-wide licensing while retaining 
the American Needle rule for packaged licensing of individual 
team intellectual properties. This Note concludes by arguing 
 The distinction between the League bundling its 
teams’ intellectual property and the League licensing itself as a 
whole justifies another look at whether leagues like the NFL 
should be granted single-entity status in limited and specific 
instances. 
 
competitively). 
 15. See Irwin A. Kishner & Julie Albinsky, Very Much Ado About . . . 
Nothing: An Analysis of the Impact of American Needle v. NFL on Collective 
Bargaining and Merchandising in Professional Sports, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 
3, 6 (2011) (illustrating the potential for collective bargaining challenges when 
the NFL’s uniform bargaining position is called into question). 
 16. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to 
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 767–75 (2010) (exploring implications 
for other sports leagues, including the NBA and the NHL). 
 17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 
(2010). 
 18. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the 
NFL Respondents at 9, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201 (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 
4074860 (claiming that the relationship between the League and Electronic 
Arts requires a unique operating relationship). 
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that the impact on competitive balance, the ability of a league 
to market itself, and the ability of a league to effectively coordi-
nate and innovate with exclusive partners all justify single-
entity treatment where the league is licensing itself as a whole. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF AND CHALLENGES TO THE 
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AS A COLLECTIVE 
ENTITY   
The broad economic underpinnings of the NFL, the under-
lying facts of the case, the single-entity argument more gener-
ally, and the lower court rulings are all essential to under-
standing the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle. 
This Part examines each of those in turn. 
A. THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AS A 
COLLECTIVE ENTITY 
The National Football League was organized in 1920 as an 
unincorporated association of professional football teams.19 Pri-
or to 1963, each team in the League made separate agreements 
for the marketing and licensing of its individual intellectual 
property.20 Because individual teams operated in discrete mar-
kets of differing size and economic activity, individualized li-
censing risked exacerbating already existing economic imbal-
ances across the League.21 NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle 
viewed this as a fundamental problem, arguing that only an 
economically balanced league could create the competitive equi-
ty necessary for commercial success.22
 
 19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 After persuading a ma-
jority of the NFL’s owners that promotion of the League as a 
whole against other forms of entertainment was in the NFL’s 
collective self-interest, Rozelle succeeded in convincing the 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., DAVID BLEVINS, 2 THE SPORTS HALL OF FAME ENCYCLOPEDIA 
836 (2012) (observing that when Pete Rozelle became Commissioner of the 
NFL in 1960, the NFL “consisted of 10 teams playing a 12-game schedule to 
half-empty stadiums, with only a few teams having television deals”). 
 22. McCann, supra note 16, at 732 n.23 (citing David Harris, Pete Rozelle: 
The Man Who Made Football an American Obsession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
1984, § 6, at 12). For an econometric analysis validating Rozelle’s belief in rev-
enue sharing as a competitive good, see Jake I. Fisher, The NFL’s Current 
Business Model and the Potential 2011 Lockout 11–12 (May 4, 2010), (un-
published essay, Harvard University) http://harvardsportsanalysis.files 
.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-business-model-and-potential-lockout.pdf (ar-
guing that revenue sharing creates the optimal conditions for teams to both 
create a competitive product and to maximize relative revenue). 
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League’s teams to collectively promote the League’s brand.23 To 
that end, the NFL instituted a program of revenue sharing in 
which approximately 60% of revenues would be generated by 
the League itself and equally distributed among teams, while 
the teams would separately raise and retain the remaining 40% 
of League revenue.24 By the 2001–02 season, the League was 
generating $2.6 billion in shared revenue, an average of $72 
million for each team.25 Not only are such figures substantial, 
but shared revenues from licensing represent the fastest grow-
ing sector of the NFL’s economic model.26 Such licensing ar-
rangements have proven so successful that they are considered 
essential to the professional sports model.27
As a component of their revenue sharing program, the 
League formed NFL Properties (NFLP), a distinct corporate en-
tity tasked with “(1) developing, licensing, and marketing the 
intellectual property the teams owned, such as their logos, 
trademarks, and other indicia; and (2) ‘conduct[ing] and 
engag[ing] in advertising campaigns and promotional ventures 
on behalf of the NFL and [its] member [teams].’”
 
28
 
 23. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 
2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201; see also McCann, supra 
note 
 From 1963 
until 2000, NFLP granted headwear licenses to a number of 
16, at 731–32 (elucidating Rozelle’s ideological vision of the NFL’s future 
being tied to all team owners viewing themselves as stakeholders in a larger 
league project).  
 24. Fisher, supra note 22, at 3–4 (extrapolating based on shareholder in-
formation provided by the Green Bay Packers, who are publicly owned). The 
League claims to evenly share over eighty percent of total revenues. Nathaniel 
Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense Under 
Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 490 (2011) (citing Brief 
for the NFL Respondents at 6, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201 (No. 08-661)). 
 25. Ellen Terrell et al., The Sports Industry: Football, BUS. & ECON. RES. 
ADVISOR (Summer 2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/ 
issue3/football.html. 
 26. See One.Cool.Customer, NFL Lockout 2011: The NFL’s Revenue Gap 
Problem, BLOGGING THE BOYS (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:01 AM), http://www 
.bloggingtheboys.com/2011/2/21/2004505/nfl-lockout-2011-revenue-gap 
-problem (identifying the rapid growth in revenue streams from licensing, 
broadcasting through the League-owned NFL Network, and non-network tele-
vision contracts with Comcast and DirecTV as particularly strong sources of 
growth). See generally Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in 
the NFL: Perfecting the Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained 
Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641, 642–60 (2006) (identifying the 
origins of, massive growth behind, and modern challenges to the NFL revenue 
sharing system). 
 27. Fortunado & Martin, supra note 14, at 74. 
 28. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 737. 
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vendors simultaneously, including American Needle.29 While 
total sales of apparel in the aggregate had reached $4 billion by 
2000, the overall growth in sales of NFL products had started 
to decline.30 Outside consultants identified the problem as a 
glut of licensing agreements—leading to a glut of products—
and told the NFL that the appropriate response would be to en-
ter into exclusive licensing agreements.31
In December 2000, the NFL teams authorized NFLP to so-
licit and grant exclusive licenses.
 
32 The NFL subsequently 
granted Electronic Arts an exclusive video game license,33 
granted Reebok an exclusive ten-year apparel license,34 and de-
clined to renew American Needle’s license.35 While litigation 
challenging Electronic Arts’s exclusive license was only initiat-
ed relatively recently and is still slowly moving through the 
courts,36 the challenge against Reebok was brought almost im-
mediately. American Needle filed suit against the NFL, NFLP, 
the individual NFL teams, and Reebok in federal district court 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.37 The NFL de-
fendants responded by filing a summary judgment motion ar-
guing that since the teams and the League acted as a single en-
tity, they could not be held liable under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.38 The district court held that the NFL was a single entity 
and thus was not subject to liability under antitrust law.39
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY DEFENSE 
 
The single-entity defense to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp.40
 
 29. Id. at 737–38. 
 In Copperweld, the Supreme 
 30. Terrell et al., supra note 25. 
 31. McCann, supra note 16, at 733 (identifying the consolidation decision 
as originating with apparel merchandizing expert Chuck Zona). 
 32. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 
(2010). 
 33. Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 34. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (denying the motion to dismiss in part 
and allowing for class certification and discovery proceedings to begin). 
 37. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 
2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 740–41. 
 40. McCann, supra note 16, at 742 (citing Ryan P. Meyers, Comment, Par-
tial Ownership of Subsidiaries, Unity of Purpose, and Antitrust Liability, 68 U. 
  
2358 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2352 
 
Court determined that the coordinated activity of a parent 
company and a wholly owned subsidiary should be viewed as 
the action of a single entity instead of multiple competitive en-
tities, and thus these companies cannot be liable under Section 
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.41 This treatment stems from 
two central premises. First, because the objectives of the parent 
and its subsidiary are common and guided “not by two separate 
consciousnesses, but one,” there cannot be any “agreement” in 
Sherman Act terms.42 Second, determining whether antitrust 
liability should apply is not a function of form, but is rather a 
question of whether or not there is actual competition.43 The 
Court rejected purely formalistic distinctions as counterproduc-
tive and harmful to consumer interests.44
The Copperweld Court explicitly limited its holding to the 
decisions of a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.
 
45 
Federal courts in subsequent cases, however, have extended 
the single-entity shield beyond a parent-subsidiary relationship 
to affiliated companies and individuals.46 The most recent Su-
preme Court decision on the issue prior to American Needle, 
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, suggests that the single-entity theory 
could be applied beyond a strict parent-subsidiary relation-
ship.47 In Dagher, the Court considered an arrangement be-
tween Texaco and Shell to consolidate operations and jointly 
share gains and losses for their operations in the western Unit-
ed States.48
 
CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (2001)); see also Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 738 (outlin-
ing the conclusion from Copperweld). 
 In the face of a Sherman Act challenge, the Court 
upheld the joint venture as a legitimate exercise of single-entity 
 41. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 
(1984). 
 42. Id. The Court illustrated this concept through a metaphor of “a multi-
ple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 772–73. 
 44. Id. at 772–74. 
 45. McCann, supra note 16, at 744 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767). 
 46. See, e.g., Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, 
Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding lack of ownership of regional 
affiliates irrelevant); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, 213 F.3d 
198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that in for-profit sports leagues, leagues and 
teams share interest); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 
95 F.3d 593, 597–600 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding the NBA to be a single entity); 
City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 271, 276–77 
(8th Cir. 1988) (finding cooperative power grids not in competition). 
 47. 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 48. Id. at 4. 
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status.49 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that 
once two separate partners entered into a joint venture, they 
must be able to set their prices “like any other firm.”50
C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN AMERICAN NEEDLE 
 The 
question for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court in American Needle, therefore, was whether such 
a theory should extend to the NFL in the licensing of its appar-
el. 
In response to the seemingly clear-cut question of whether 
or not to treat the NFL as a single entity, the Seventh Circuit 
instead identified ways in which the NFL is arguably both a 
single non-competitive entity and a combination of multiple 
competitive entities.51 From the perspective of the fans, the 
NFL is a single, entertainment-providing entity producing “one 
product.”52 From the perspective of the player-employees, how-
ever, each team is an independent entity with the ability to 
“hire and fire employees.”53 In light of the uncertainty involved 
with various facets of the League operation, the Seventh Cir-
cuit focused their review on “the question of whether a profes-
sional sports league is a single entity . . . not only ‘one league at 
a time,’ but also ‘one facet of a league at a time.’”54 Under this 
standard, the Seventh Circuit limited its examination to the 
organizational relationship between the NFL, the thirty-two 
NFL teams, and the NFLP, and the business relationship be-
tween the NFL and its teams only insofar as they pertained to 
the licensing of intellectual property (in this case, the licensing 
of team apparel).55
In examining the substantive economic effects of the licens-
ing agreement rather than the labeling of the constituent parts, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the NFL, through NFLP, 
acted as one source of economic power in the licensing of its in-
 
 
 49. Id. at 6. 
 50. Id. at 7. 
 51. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 741–44 (7th 
Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 
2201 (2010). 
 52. Id. at 741 (quoting Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 53. Id. at 741–42 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 
(1996)). 
 54. Id. at 742. 
 55. Id. 
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tellectual property.56 The Seventh Circuit determined that 
“American Needle’s proposed approach is one step removed 
from saying that the NFL teams can be a single entity only if 
the teams have ‘a complete unity of interest’—a legal proposi-
tion that we have rejected as ‘silly.’”57 Finding that no team can 
produce a football game by itself and that “NFL teams are best 
described as a single source of economic power when promoting 
NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property” 
to compete against other forms of entertainment, Judge Kanne 
held that the NFL must necessarily be exempt from liability 
under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act.58
D. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING IN AMERICAN NEEDLE 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle further 
reduced the scope of inquiry down to one threshold question: 
“whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a 
‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy’ as defined by § 1 of 
the Sherman Act.”59 Justice Stevens began by identifying Con-
gress’s intent to treat concerted action more strictly than inde-
pendent behavior because of the high likelihood of anticompeti-
tive risk.60 Echoing the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens stated 
that formalistic distinctions must be set aside in favor of func-
tional considerations of how the parties involved actually be-
haved.61 The key distinction that needs to be ascertained under 
this test, he wrote, is whether or not “separate economic actors 
pursuing separate economic interests” have taken concerted ac-
tion.62
Examining the actual use and licensing of intellectual 
property under this framework, Justice Stevens concluded that 
“teams compete in the market of intellectual property.”
 
63
 
 56. Id. at 743. 
 Be-
cause New Orleans Saints hats and Indianapolis Colts hats are 
directly competitive products in the marketplace, each team 
acts as a separate economic actor pursuing its own financial 
 57. Id. at 743 (citing Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, 95 F.3d at 598). 
 58. Id. at 743–44. 
 59. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 
(2010). 
 60. Id. at 2208–09. 
 61. Id. at 2209–10. 
 62. Id. at 2211–12 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)). 
 63. Id. at 2213. 
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gain in the marketplace.64 In response to the Seventh Circuit’s 
argument that a team cannot produce a football game by itself, 
Justice Stevens retorted that while “two teams are needed to 
play a football game, not all aspects of elaborate interleague co-
operation are necessary to produce a game.”65 In response to the 
Seventh Circuit’s argument that the League is a functional sin-
gle economic actor, Justice Stevens responded that “teams re-
main separately controlled, potential competitors with econom-
ic interests that are distinct from NFLP’s financial well-
being.”66 Justice Stevens concluded that so long as teams are 
separately owned economic actors, they cannot be seen as part 
of a single entity.67
Justice Stevens’s most interesting analysis, however, came 
in Part VI of his opinion. While he ultimately concluded that 
antitrust law was generally applicable, Justice Stevens drew an 
area of exception around “[t]he fact that NFL teams share an 
interest in making the entire league successful and profitable, 
and that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling 
of games.”
  
68 Justice Stevens also argued that the attempt to 
achieve competitive balance is a legitimate goal that profes-
sional sports leagues like the NFL have a special interest in 
achieving.69 Because Stevens determined that NFL teams were 
capable of collectively violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
however, the Court rejected the single-entity defense and in-
stead required an analysis of the licensing arrangement under 
the Rule of Reason.70 Subsequently, Stevens remanded the case 
for consideration on those grounds.71 The Rule of Reason re-
quires courts to evaluate whether a restraint promotes or de-
stroys competition by “the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable.”72
 
 64. Id. 
 While Stevens concluded at the very end 
of the decision that there is no basis for single-entity status to 
 65. Id. at 2214 n.7. 
 66. Id. at 2215. 
 67. Id. at 2215–16. 
 68. Id. at 2216. 
 69. Id. at 2217 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). 
 70. Id. at 2216. 
 71. Id. at 2217. 
 72. Id. at 2217 n.10 (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). 
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be granted to collective licenses of league intellectual property 
specifically,73
II.  THE LIMITATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF DENYING 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES THE ABILITY TO 
EXCLUSIVELY LICENSE THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY   
 he potentially left an opening for a distinction to 
be drawn and limited single-entity protection to be established 
for some forms of collective activity. Part II of this Note will ex-
amine the difficulties of applying strict Rule of Reason liability 
to professional sports leagues, specifically in the context of the 
licensing of the NFL as a whole in video games. 
While a broad extension of the American Needle decision 
would have an effect on the NFL’s business model across the 
board and on antitrust law more generally, attempting to de-
scribe all conceivable consequences of such an extension would 
result in a shallow, surface-level analysis. As a result, this Note 
examines the consequences of entirely precluding the single-
entity argument by focusing on the League’s exclusive licensing 
agreement with Electronic Arts. This Part begins with a dis-
cussion of the economics of collective licensing and the threat 
that the American Needle framework poses to both consumers’ 
marketplace options and to the League’s ability to license itself 
as a whole. It then analyzes the Electronic Arts agreement un-
der the Rule of Reason. This Part concludes by identifying the 
likely impacts to eliminating the exclusive licensing agreement, 
both in terms of broader non-compliance and competitive ef-
fects throughout the League. 
A. THE NFL AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS IN COLLECTIVE 
LICENSING 
Sports video games, especially football video games, have 
generally succeeded or failed based on the strength of the li-
cense behind them.74
 
 73. Id. at 2217. 
 Games that have attempted to compete 
with Electronic Arts on its own terms, by providing realistically 
recreated on-field action and employing former NFL legends, 
 74. See Chad Lakkis, EA Exclusive NFL License Undone? Sports Antitrust 
Law Professor Explains American Needle Impact, RIPTEN (May 28, 2010, 6:36 
PM), http://www.ripten.com/2010/05/28/sports-antitrust-law-professor 
-explains-american-needle-verdict-impact-on-eas-exclusive-nfl-licensing-
agreement (explaining that the broad trend in sports video game sales sug-
gests the license is the most important indicator of commercial success). 
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have not been able to compete with the Madden franchise.75 
Even video games that attempted to reject the NFL’s realism 
and instead focused on the seamier, more violent, or more ab-
surd aspects of the sport were unable to compete with Madden 
absent the NFL license.76 As a consequence, the only way to 
create a viable football simulation is to arrange a licensing 
agreement that includes every team and recreates the League 
as a whole.77 In a world where the League cannot license itself 
holistically because of a strict application of the American Nee-
dle rule, individual teams or divisions could splinter off to cre-
ate their own rival games, creating a balkanized, fractured 
marketplace.78 While it is possible that all thirty-two NFL 
teams would separately negotiate agreements with Electronic 
Arts, such a unified effort seems unlikely in light of previous 
attempts by owners to defy the will of the League, especially 
because teams would be likely to acquire strong financial bene-
fits over the long term.79
Instead of entering into exclusive licensing agreements, the 
NFL could instead adopt non-exclusive collective licensing 
agreements that allow teams to license themselves to multiple 
competing game producers. Pre-existing exclusive licenses 
granted by the NFL, including the Electronic Arts agreement 
through 2014, render any new licensing structures impossible 
in the short term.
  
80
 
 75. Id. 
 Additionally, the expenses involved with li-
censing have functionally limited every major sport to one li-
 76. Id. 
 77. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the 
NFL Respondents, supra note 18, at 15 (arguing that companies pursuing an 
exclusivity agreement need to know if they are “buying a license or an anti-
trust lawsuit”). 
 78. Supreme Court Rules Against NFL Being Single Entity, PASTAPADRE 
(May 24, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/05/24/supreme 
-court-rules-against-nfl-being-single-entity (arguing that large market teams 
or even NFL divisions could license themselves to create competing titles). 
While it is arguable whether these titles would be broadly successful, experi-
ence in other sports illustrates that this sort of balkanization could happen. 
See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 79. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 
F.2d 1381, 1384–86, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding a challenge by owner Al 
Davis attempting to move his football team to Los Angeles); Dall. Cowboys 
Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95-9426, 1996 WL 
601705 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1996) (involving claims by the Dallas Cowboys chal-
lenging the NFLP’s licensing agreement).  
 80. See Hruby, supra note 1. 
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censed provider, seemingly necessitating exclusivity.81 Even if 
these factors change over the long term, however, such non-
exclusive agreements would largely eliminate the appeal for a 
company to sign a licensing agreement at all, because the value 
of the license lies in both its exclusivity and its completeness.82 
Especially in the context of football, having the ability to exclu-
sively license all the rights to the League is essential to having 
a viable product.83 Further, there is no logical end-point to the 
process of removing licensing authority—teams, players, coach-
es, and stadium owners all could lose their collectively licensed 
status and have to be courted, negotiated with, and signed in-
dividually.84 Such a move would not only deter video game de-
velopers from pursuing a license to create a similar game in the 
future, but it would likely render the attempt to make one fi-
nancially infeasible—football video gaming’s nuclear winter.85 
The loss of the ability to effectively license the NFL would put 
both the video game market in jeopardy and the League itself 
into worse financial straits.86
 
 81. See Owen Good, You Can Have Any Sports Video Game You Want, But 
There’s Only One, KOTAKU (May 28, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://kotaku.com/ 
5806547/you-can-have-any-sports-video-game-you-want-but-theres-only-one 
(identifying the existence of one major sports title apiece for the NFL, NBA, 
NHL, FIFA soccer, NASCAR, UFC, and functionally for the MLB). 
 Regardless of potential theoretical 
 82. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL 
Respondents, supra note 18, at 10–11 (arguing that exclusive blanket licensing 
agreements are often necessary to create a new product). 
 83. See Lakkis, supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 84. To a certain extent, this has already happened with certain superstars 
including Michael Jordan and Barry Bonds “opting out” of collective licensing 
by their player associations. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Bonds Will Be Individu-
ally Licensed, ESPN.COM (Nov. 17, 2003, 12:09 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
mlb/news/story?id=1661883 (illustrating an interest in some superstar ath-
letes to test the market and make more money through individual endorse-
ment deals). 
 85. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL 
Respondents, supra note 18, at 9 (arguing that Electronic Arts could not feasi-
bly create a licensed NFL game without some ability to corral rights for play-
ers, coaches, teams, stadiums, and other essential components of the game ex-
perience). 
 86. Id. at 10–12. While it could be argued that the success of the NCAA 
video game diminishes the importance of player names and likenesses, this 
argument is a nonstarter because the NCAA has a similar exclusive licensing 
agreement for all the teams and conferences, and puts the likenesses of play-
ers into the game surreptitiously. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 757, 760–66 (D.N.J. 2011) (describing and ultimately upholding Elec-
tronic Arts’s practices in creating a collegiate football game that, despite only 
identifying players by numbers, uses the actual biographical and physical in-
formation provided in team media guides); Good, supra note 81 (illustrating 
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alternatives, the NFL’s existing licensing agreements and de-
sire to reach mutually beneficial terms with licensing partners 
functionally mandate that League intellectual property will 
continue to be licensed exclusively. 
The real losers, in either the balkanization example or the 
nuclear-winter example, are the consumers who watch the NFL 
and purchase the video games in question. If a football fan 
wants to virtually recreate a matchup they saw in their living 
room the week before, they may no longer be able to because 
those teams don’t even occupy the same game. As well-known 
game sector analyst Michael Pachter argues, “Having each 
team negotiate the terms of a video game license would mean 
that there could be 32 separate games, and that potentially, on-
ly one team would appear in each.”87 A fragmented marketplace 
is the worst possible consumer environment, as it fills the mar-
ketplace with a glut of inferior products and risks gradually 
eliminating the incentive to create any new titles.88
While many readers may not consider the ability of con-
sumers to play the games of their choice as a viable harm, it is 
impossible to discount the role that the creation of video games 
(in particular, sports video games) have on the U.S. economy. 
Video game sales are a critical and growing economic sector, 
with $25.1 billion in sales of video games in 2010.
 
89 Sports 
games made up 16.3% of that market, comprising a total mar-
ket share of nearly $4.1 billion dollars in sales annually.90 As 
Texas Representative Kevin Brady has noted, the video game 
industry “has generated more than 120,000 jobs in over 34 
states and is a major international player as well.”91
 
how Electronic Arts is the sole owner of the NCAA’s intellectual property). 
 Absent the 
viability of video games like Electronic Arts’s Madden fran-
 87. Owen Good, What the NFL Antitrust Ruling Might Mean for Madden, 
KOTAKU (May 24, 2010, 6:20 PM), http://kotaku.com/5546408/what-the-nfl 
-antitrust-ruling-might-mean-for-madden. 
 88. This is not a purely hypothetical situation either. See Owen Good, Will 
We Have Any Baseball Video Game on Xbox 360 Next Year?, KOTAKU (Apr. 21, 
2012, 7:30 PM), http://kotaku.com/5904056/will-we-have-any-baseball-video 
-game-on-the-xbox-360-next-year (identifying how license proliferation has 
segmented the market, leaving an entire gaming console without any baseball 
simulation). 
 89. ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY, 
2011 SALES, DEMOGRAPHICS AND USAGE DATA, ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N 11 
(2011), available at http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/ESA_EF_2011.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. Id. at 11. 
  
2366 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2352 
 
chise, the video games market could see an immediate and sig-
nificant decline.92
The main argument that opponents of license exclusivity 
advance to dispute that Electronic Arts’s license is good for the 
marketplace and consumers is that the exclusive licensing ar-
rangement and subsequent lack of competition has driven up 
prices.
 
93 A University of Michigan economics professor estimat-
ed that the amount Electronic Arts has overcharged consumers 
ranges from $701 to $926 million.94 Michael Pachter, however, 
hotly disputes this figure.95 First, Pachter argues that the cal-
culation does not appear to be based on actual sales during the 
period of exclusivity, which he calculates to have added approx-
imately $1.18 to the total cost of the product.96 Second, Pachter 
argues that the comparison itself is flawed because Electronic 
Arts’s main competitor at the time, Take-Two Interactive, pur-
posefully discounted its product below cost and ended up hurt-
ing themselves in the bargain.97 Finally, Pachter argues that 
because all other video games exclusively license their intellec-
tual property, it is disingenuous to claim that there is a right to 
a non-exclusive sports licensing agreement.98
 
 92. See id. at 9 (identifying Madden NFL 11 as the number two video 
game in the world in terms of units sold in 2010). See also Rachel Metz, Late 
‘Madden’ Saps August Video Game Sales, CNS NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), http:// 
cnsnews.com/news/article/late-madden-saps-august-video-game-sales (arguing 
that a slight delay in the release of Madden NFL 12 in August 2011 caused a 
significant decline in video game sales for the month). 
 In any case, the 
economics of the situation face a drastic potential change in 
light of the American Needle decision, a licensing arrangement 
that may end up being counterproductive for consumers if chal-
lenged and discarded as a part of the Court’s Rule of Reason 
analysis. 
 93. Economist: EA’s Madden Monopoly Cost Gamers up to $926 Million, 
GAMEPOLITICS (July 14, 2009), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2009/07/14/ 
economist-ea039s-madden-monopoly-cost-gamers-926-million. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Pachter: Economist’s Claims in Madden Monopoly Case Irresponsible, 
GAMEPOLITICS (July 15, 2009), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2009/07/15/ 
pachter-economist039s-claims-madden-monopoly-case-irresponsible. 
 96. Id. This constitutes a tiny fraction of McKie-Mason’s estimate of con-
sumer damages. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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B. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS THREATENS EXCLUSIVE VIDEO 
GAME LICENSING 
Part VI of Justice Stevens’s American Needle opinion ob-
serves that a broad reading of the Rule of Reason will uphold 
most NFL agreements.99 A related concern arises however—
what about arrangements that presumptively would not meet 
the Rule of Reason? There are reasons to believe the relative 
market share of Electronic Arts, combined with its use of exclu-
sive licensing agreements like the NFL agreement, could pose a 
problem under the standard.100 The primary issue for Electronic 
Arts is the sheer number of exclusive licensing and publishing 
agreements it owns, which have secured “four different profes-
sional leagues, an entire player’s union, and a media giant.”101 
Further, Electronic Arts has nearly locked up the football li-
cense market in its entirety, exclusively licensing collegiate 
football and the Arena Football League.102 In sports gaming, 
Electronic Arts holds 63% of all sports licenses, a prohibitive 
command of the market.103 All of these factors suggest that 
Electronic Arts may have the market share to be considered a 
monopoly that could be broken up under antitrust law.104 Under 
a Rule of Reason analysis, an organization with monopoly pow-
er and that uses that power in a predatory way will generally 
be struck down.105
On the other hand, however, condensing licenses into the 
hands of one game producer, in this case Electronic Arts, may 
lead to efficiencies that justify the NFL’s choice to pick a single 
licensee.
 
106 The Rule of Reason would require the NFL to pro-
vide reason why their licensing agreement is reasonably pro-
competitive instead of anti-competitive.107
 
 99. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) 
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984)) (holding that the Rule of Reason can “sometimes be 
applied in the twinkling of an eye”). 
 Electronic Arts pro-
 100. Liron Offir, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Gaming Industry 
Awoke to Realize that Electronic Arts Was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 
91, 115 (2006). 
 101. Id. at 99 (referring to NCAA football, the Arena Football League, the 
NFL, FIFA soccer, the NFL Players Association, and ESPN). 
 102. Id. at 99–102. 
 103. Id. at 113. 
 104. Id. at 115. 
 105. Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal 
Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 616 (2008). 
 106. Masteralexis, supra note 13. 
 107. Id. 
  
2368 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2352 
 
vided a number of reasons why their activity is pro-competitive 
in their brief to the American Needle Court: decreased transac-
tion costs due to streamlined relations between the NFL and 
Electronic Arts,108 the ability to effectively manage and main-
tain the high quality of their brand,109 and the substantial in-
novation effects of having a year-to-year developer.110
Even if the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement with Elec-
tronic Arts does not meet the standards for the Rule of Reason 
established in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States con-
cerning monopolistic behavior,
 
111 the Court should exempt this 
specific instance because of both the unique requirements of 
collective and exclusive licensing in sports video games,112 and 
the special competitive purpose protected under the deferential 
posture the Court has taken regarding sports in its previous ju-
risprudence.113 Despite Justice Stevens’s claim that under Rule 
of Reason analysis, approval for such programs can often be 
done “in the twinkling of an eye,” the near-monopoly held by 
Electronic Arts makes it highly doubtful that sports gaming 
would receive such a cursory examination.114
C. ANTI-COMPETITIVE IMPACTS OF A STRICT APPLICATION OF 
AMERICAN NEEDLE ON THE LEAGUE 
 As will be illus-
trated in the next Part, the potential effects of anti-competitive 
behavior within the League have such deleterious consequences 
that it is preferable overall to treat the licensing arrangement 
as an acceptable single-entity practice.  
Justice Stevens took caution to emphasize the critical in-
terests the NFL has in promoting competitive balance across 
the League’s teams.115
 
 108. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL 
Respondents, supra note 
 The inherent potential for anti-
competitive behavior in the application of each level of collec-
tive licensing failure, however, is nothing short of alarming. 
18, at 14 (arguing that working exclusively with the 
NFL allowed for a “substantial lowering of costs” which could be passed on to 
consumers). 
 109. Id. at 12. 
 110. Masteralexis, supra note 13. 
 111. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 114. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) 
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85 (1984)). 
 115. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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First, should the collective licensing marketplace fail, the en-
tire League would be deprived of substantial amounts of money 
that are shared evenly among the thirty-two NFL teams. Not 
only is this money important, but it is the single-fastest grow-
ing sector of the NFL economy, and teams will be driven to cap-
ture this money with or without the League.116 As teams in-
creasingly pursue maximization of local revenue streams that 
are not part of the revenue sharing system (including stadium 
profits and local licenses),117 the core aspects of revenue sharing 
(in this case, the ability of the league to license itself) becomes 
extremely important to encouraging league-wide competitive 
balance. Because this shared money is generally enough to pay 
for the entirety of a team’s salary expenses, striking a blow 
against the system of revenue sharing threatens competitive 
balance across the League.118
Second, the problems of holdout markets and non-
compliant teams will only be exacerbated in a world where dif-
ferential licensing allows for some teams to strike preferential 
deals while others are left without.
 
119 Huge disparities in reve-
nue streams between have and have-not teams are already be-
ginning to develop.120 Any move towards preferential licensing 
of large-market team intellectual property will only serve to 
exacerbate the financial differences between large-market 
teams, which may be able to support themselves independently 
or at the very least strike a much more favorable financial deal, 
and small-market teams, which will likely be left in the 
lurch.121
 
 116. See supra note 
 This risks the development of economics similar to 
26 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Moorhead, supra note 26, at 660–64 (arguing that teams are doing 
everything in their power to maximize the profits they can gain from local fees 
including tertiary licensing, ticketing, and parking fees). 
 118. See id. at 669–71 (arguing that the NFL’s extreme competitive parity 
across all teams in the League is a direct result of the broad system of revenue 
sharing). 
 119. The licensing of soccer video games provides an excellent example of 
this phenomenon, as individual clubs often sign licenses away from their 
leagues and cause a conflicting mishmash of real and fake players, clubs, and 
leagues. See Prarthito Maity, FIFA 12 Vs Pro Evolution Soccer 12 - A Review 
(Videos), INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://m.ibtimes.com/ 
fifa-12-vs-pro-evolution-soccer-review-249473.html. 
 120. Moorhead, supra note 26, at 666–68. 
 121. An easy analogy can be made to the creation of regional sports net-
works, which have given big market teams in baseball access to millions or 
even billions of dollars more than their rivals. See Richard Sandomir, Regional 
Sports Networks Show the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at D1. 
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baseball, where the large markets can easily dominate because 
of their built-in financial advantages.122
Finally, even with the NFL’s hard salary cap, which limits 
the total salary each team may pay to all of its players, there 
are still substantial benefits that can and will accrue to teams 
with more money.
 
123 While teams are limited in the number of 
players they can have on their roster and the total amount of 
money they can pay them, they have unlimited discretion to 
spend their money on tertiary benefits to those players.124 Gen-
erally speaking, teams with the highest paid coaches and high-
er quality facilities tend to win more often.125 Additionally, 
through the use of prorated bonuses, teams can spend well 
above the salary cap if they have the means to do so.126 The 
consequence of this is that a salary cap system designed to give 
smaller markets a better chance to compete has in many ways 
become a force that harms small-market teams, which have 
less room to make mistakes.127
This seemingly anti-competitive effect is arguably just the 
outgrowth of the fact that sports teams are nothing more than 
corporate entities competing in a tightly regulated form of capi-
talism. This argument, however, ignores years of Court prece-
dent identifying sports as categorically different under the 
 Because the salary cap system 
alone is not enough to protect the interests of small-market 
teams, collective licensing of the League is necessary to main-
tain competitive balance across the NFL.  
 
 122. While small-market teams in baseball can compete by exploiting un-
dervalued assets, having a large-market team represents the easiest path to 
continued success. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF 
WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004). 
 123. See generally Al Lackner, NFL Salary Cap FAQ, ASKTHECOMMISH 
.COM (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.askthecommish.com/salarycap/faq.asp (illus-
trating the rules of the NFL’s salary cap and how it functions to create year-
to-year spending parity). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Eric Ostermeier, Will a New Stadium Make the Minnesota Vikings 
a More Successful Franchise?, SMART POL. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://blog.lib.umn 
.edu/cspg/smartpolitics/2009/12/will_a_new_stadium_make_the_mi.php 
(demonstrating a statistical correlation between new stadiums and subse-
quent team success); Tom Van Riper, The Highest-Paid NFL Coaches, FORBES 
(Jan. 4, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/04/patriots-redskins 
-seahawks-business-sports-nfl-highest-paid-coaches.html (arguing that there 
is a statistical correlation between coach pay and overall success).  
 126. See Moorhead, supra note 26, at 671–72 (arguing that teams with the 
means often use financial tricks to put the actual cost of a contract well off in-
to the future). 
 127. Id. at 670–71. 
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law.128 Even beyond what the Court has stated, however, it is 
difficult to see why courts should apply the Sherman Act, a 
piece of legislation aimed at stopping the destructive excesses 
of restraints on trade, in such a way that would be broadly de-
structive to League competitive interests.129
III.  THE SELF-LICENSING EXEMPTION: LIMITED 
SINGLE-ENTITY STATUS FOR SPORTS LEAGUES 
LICENSING THEMSELVES AS A WHOLE   
 A better compro-
mise, as identified in Part III, is to judge whether the agree-
ment licenses the League as a whole, and is pro-competitive, or 
if it licenses individual team intellectual property collectively, 
and is anti-competitive. 
As illustrated above, applying a Rule of Reason analysis to 
the licensing of League intellectual property will result in less 
efficiency, less competition within the League itself, and direct 
harm to the consumer and the marketplace.130
A. COURTS SHOULD EXAMINE CHALLENGES TO LICENSING 
ARRANGEMENTS BY FOCUSING ON WHETHER A COMPETITIVE 
WHOLE OR ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS HAVE BEEN LICENSED 
 Consequently, 
this Part proposes an exemption to the general rule in Ameri-
can Needle allowing single-entity treatment where a profes-
sional sports league acts to license its own intellectual property 
while disallowing single-entity treatment as it applies to indi-
vidual team intellectual property bundled and licensed collec-
tively.  
This Part proposes a Court-imposed exemption to the gen-
eral rule in American Needle that differentiates between licens-
ing agreements that collectively license individual team intel-
lectual property that has been bundled together and those 
agreements that license the intellectual property of the League 
as a whole. First, this Part argues that the rule in American 
Needle should continue to be applied in cases where directly 
competitive products are licensed together. Second, this Part 
argues that where the intellectual property being licensed rep-
resents the League as a holistic entity, such licensing agree-
ments should be upheld against Sherman Act challenges under 
the Court’s single-entity precedent. 
 
 128. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 129. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 130. See supra Part II. 
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1. The American Needle Rule Should Be Retained and 
Sherman Act Liability Should Apply to Separable Team 
Intellectual Property 
While the application of the principles of American Needle 
too broadly beyond the facts of the case is unnecessary, on its 
own merits the decision is entirely defensible. When teams li-
cense their individual intellectual property through a collective 
entity, it precludes directly competitive market goods from en-
tering the marketplace.131 With logos on a hat, the Colts and 
Saints do directly compete in a marketplace.132
2. Single-Entity Status Should Be Granted When the League 
Licenses Itself as a Collective Entity 
 In a similar 
fashion, attempts by the League to manage or pool the profits 
from individual team initiatives like fan promotions, facility 
and stadium use, and player appearances would facially violate 
this standard, because they would regulate a team from pro-
moting itself versus other competing teams. Similarly, agree-
ments that purport to license the League as a whole but in-
stead merely grant the licensee the authority to recreate, 
reproduce, or otherwise duplicate the indicia of the various 
NFL teams would facially violate the standard because the li-
cense does not have to be employed in a collective fashion. So 
long as what is being promoted is the team itself, independent 
of its role in the League in a holistic competitive sense, the 
NFL has no authority to regulate how a team may promote and 
sell its intellectual property. 
In contrast to situations where the thirty-two NFL teams 
take action outside of the competitive league framework in an 
attempt to promote their individual interests, instances where 
the League licenses itself as a holistic entity should not be un-
derstood to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. In instances like 
the exclusive licensing agreement with Electronic Arts, or for 
that matter the League’s licensing of their “NFL Network” to 
cable and satellite companies, the League is licensing its own 
intellectual property centered on the concept of the League as a 
whole. One possible way in which the League could conceivably 
license itself is by hiring a company to create and display com-
puter simulations of upcoming games. As the simulations 
would lack any independent meaning outside of the schedule, 
 
 131. See supra Part I.D. 
 132. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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rules, and competitive structure of the NFL, arguing that this 
represents a collective license of team intellectual property ra-
ther than a single license of the League itself is simply incor-
rect. Lacking any true economic competition between teams 
within the League, these examples cannot be said to be any 
sort of bundled intellectual property of particular constituent 
teams or individuals. As a result, and in order to promote the 
competitive balance of small- and large-market teams through 
revenue sharing agreements, these agreements should be iden-
tified as clear single-entity licenses that are exempted from 
American Needle and immune from Sherman Act liability. 
There are a number of reasons to prefer this understanding 
of the League as a single entity when it acts holistically. First, 
the League is promoting itself as a cohesive entity rather than 
a series of loosely joined but ultimately competitive entities. 
From the perspective of individual teams, there is clearly no 
competition between teams, because despite separate owner-
ship they have no value independent of each other—a single 
team with no one to play attracts no fans.133 From the perspec-
tive of the League as a whole, the fact that teams share nearly 
all revenue with each other and the only revenue that is not 
shared is largely local revenue with minimal competitive over-
lap suggests that there is no actual competition between 
teams.134 Second, even if it is true that an individual football 
game is a competitive event, the seasonal league schedule cul-
minating in the Super Bowl literally cannot occur without a 
concerted effort where individual teams are subordinated to the 
League.135 Finally, in instances where the League licenses itself 
as a league, it is acting as a structural unit and it reaps com-
petitive, economic and structural benefits by acting as a single 
entity as opposed to a collection of thirty-two teams.136 In the 
specific instance of licensing the NFL to Electronic Arts, the li-
cense in large part relies on having the corporate authority to 
license the League as a whole and the fact that the League is 
the center of the license.137
 
 133. McCann, supra note 
 It is important to distinguish these 
micro- and macro-level arguments from the argument in Amer-
16, at 751–52. 
 134. Grow, supra note 24, at 490–91. 
 135. Id. at 488. 
 136. See McCann, supra note 16, at 751. 
 137. See supra Part II.A. Electronic Arts licenses a lot more than the 
teams, including the League schedule, the draft and free agency rules and pro-
cedures, real life contracts and contract rules, etc. 
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ican Needle that teams are necessarily in economic competition 
with one another over the sale of their distinct intellectual 
property.138
Opponents to this approach make a few primary argu-
ments for why professional sports leagues cannot ever be single 
entities. One author contends that there are too many residual 
bundles of property rights held by teams for them to have a 
complete unity of interest, including “(1) individual gate re-
ceipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate pro-
ceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees; 
and (5) Internet/new media revenues.”
 While the thirty-two teams to a certain extent sub-
ordinate their interests to the NFL on league-wide issues, doing 
so does not preclude them from licensing their individual intel-
lectual property in separate agreements. These arguments 
merely conclude that because there are interests that can only 
be represented by the NFL as a holistic entity, those interests 
should be licensable by a single entity. 
139 In this specific case of 
the NFL, however, all of these financial interests are shared.140 
The only real remaining question is whether or not finances 
need to be completely shared between individual agents in such 
a joint venture. Based on the Court’s decision in Texaco, Inc. v. 
Dagher, however, there is no requirement that firms need to 
share all of their profits or even all of their interests across all 
aspects of their corporate identity.141 Additionally, the bundled 
property rights standard argued for here would only allow fully 
owned subsidiaries and a parent company to be considered a 
single entity, a theory which would gut the fundamental un-
derpinnings of Copperweld by placing a number of parent-
subsidiary relationships outside of a single-entity defense (at 
least where some market competition exists).142
 
 138. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 
(2010). 
 In any case, the 
distinction argued for in this Note allows collective licensing 
only in situations where the League is acting as a collective en-
tity, which still allows teams to exercise their rights over local 
revenues and nullifies the entirety of this property rights con-
cern. 
 139. Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to 
NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 925 (2008). 
 140. Grow, supra note 24, at 490–91. 
 141. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006). 
 142. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 
(1984); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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A second argument against single-entity status is that 
there are major differences between teams, including differ-
ences between large- and small-market owners, debt-bearing 
and non-debt-bearing owners, and among factions who emerge 
in the selection of a League Commissioner.143
A third argument against single-entity status challenges 
the notion that the NFL exists as a distinct legal entity when, 
at heart, independent and competitive entities comprise the 
League.
 While these 
groupings of owners suggest that there could be differences of 
opinion on the direction of the League, they don’t demonstrate 
any reason why the League itself cannot be theorized as a dis-
tinct entity. If anything, this objection could be used as evi-
dence to substantiate the bright-line distinction drawn in this 
Note—if there is a substantial disagreement among owners, the 
League likely is not licensing its own intellectual property, but 
is rather licensing the intellectual property of different teams 
in ways the teams disagree on. 
144 According to this analysis, any cartel could claim 
that they were acting through a distinct central authority and 
generally evade antitrust law.145 This argument, however, ig-
nores the fact that in American Needle, the Court clearly illus-
trated that some aspects of the League operation (including ac-
tions taken by the central league entity to maintain competitive 
balance) represented a legitimate and important central inter-
est exercised by the League itself.146 The Court, however, only 
affirmatively established scheduling, rules of play, and admin-
istrative guidelines as necessary for League operation.147 What 
the Court distinguished at the end of its decision were attempts 
to collective license teams’ “individually owned intellectual 
property,” which it argued demanded a refusal of single-entity 
treatment.148
 
 143. McCann, supra note 
 In cases where what is being licensed is the NFL 
as a whole rather than the intellectual property of its various 
teams, however, these arguments lose much of their salience 
because the licensed good itself could not exist without the ex-
istence of a central League operation. Even under a test requir-
16, at 760–62. 
 144. Meir Feder, Is There Life After Death for Sports League Immunity? 
American Needle and Beyond, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 407, 422 (2011). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010) 
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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ing that subsidiaries always be “incapable of independent ac-
tion,” the Court could determine that the NFL (when licensing 
itself as a whole) could be understood as a single operating 
unit, and thus as a single entity.149
A final argument against single-entity status contends that 
from a public policy perspective, since the unique structure of 
the NFL is the basis of each individual team’s profitability, 
there is no basis to give teams an exemption to antitrust rules 
as well.
  
150
Understanding the League as a single entity when it li-
censes itself as a whole is the only way to sensibly reconcile the 
fact that the League is both a collection of the thirty-two teams 
that comprise it and something more. When all of the interests, 
the scheduling, and the very competition between teams is 
what is at issue, the NFL clearly acts as a single entity and 
should be treated as one under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 This argument, however, assumes that teams are 
able to benefit from half participation in collective licensing ar-
rangements like the one the League concluded with Reebok in 
American Needle. The bright-line rule proposed in this Note 
would eliminate that issue by turning the focus of a court’s in-
quiry onto whether the licensing arrangement was the NFL it-
self licensing the League as a single, collective entity. Addition-
ally, this argument attempts to reject a defensible bright-line 
rule in order to make a larger economic point. Simply because 
the teams would get an economic benefit from a consistent ap-
plication of the rules of single-entity to individual teams and to 
the League as a whole is not a good reason to reject an other-
wise logical and legally consistent framework of analysis. 
B. THE COURTS, NOT CONGRESS, SHOULD IMPLEMENT THIS 
TEST 
Michael McCann, in a prospective article on the American 
Needle decision, concludes that because the Court has failed to 
fashion a bright-line rule, Congress should step in and legislate 
exemptions to the general prohibition against single-entity 
treatment of the NFL and other sports organizations.151
 
 149. Feder, supra note 
 Such 
exemptions could protect both the Court’s attempt to draw a 
144, at 422. 
 150. Camalla M. Kimbrough, Upon Further Review: How the NFL’s Exclu-
sive Licensing Agreement with Reebok Survives Antitrust Scrutiny Despite the 
League’s Flawed Single-Entity Defense, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 235, 
247 (2010). 
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clear line against collusive activity hidden behind a shell com-
pany as well as the individual interests of professional sports 
leagues.152 Additionally, such an approach would comport with 
past legislative attempts to balance the interests of antitrust 
law and professional sports leagues.153
While McCann’s argument seems compelling on its face, it 
falls into a couple of traps that suggest leaving the interpreta-
tion to the courts. First, as McCann acknowledges, putting the 
decision in the hands of Congress opens the field up to the 
League’s “government relations specialists, influential lobby-
ists, and political action committees, [who] are well-positioned 
to exert disproportionate influence on congressional 
decisionmaking.”
 
154 Once the NFL begins to exert control over 
congressional levers on this issue, it would likely spill past the 
reasonable line suggested here and extend the League’s author-
ity to collective regulation of individual team licensing and be-
yond.155 Such influence would eliminate the entire jurispru-
dence that has developed around sports leagues and antitrust, 
and could ostensibly even give League authorities leverage in 
undercutting the bargaining position of players or immunize 
the League from liability for major harms stemming from the 
game of football itself. Second, as McCann once again notes, al-
lowing the NFL to change antitrust rules could prime the pump 
for exemptions for other businesses, gradually wearing away at 
the foundation of antitrust law.156
 
 152. Id. at 780. 
 The competitive interests to 
be protected in creating a balanced league do not and should 
not apply to businesses generally, which exist in a mostly un-
regulated market (as opposed to the closed competitive entity 
that is the NFL) and need the checks and balances provided by 
the Sherman Act. Finally, the courts will inevitably have to re-
solve whatever antitrust exemptions Congress creates, and it 
seems institutionally wasteful for the Court to interpret an act 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Jed Hughes, NFL Leads All Sports Leagues in Government Lobby-
ing and Political Involvement, BLEACHER REP. (June 1, 2012), http:// 
bleacherreport.com/articles/1204804-nfl-leads-all-sports-leagues-in-lobbying-
and-political-involvement (citing a survey by First Street Research Group es-
timating 2011 lobbying expenditures for the NFL on issues including broad-
casting rights, Internet gambling, drug testing, and player safety at 
$1,620,000, which is more than the next three highest spending leagues com-
bined).  
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of Congress when it could merely create an exemption of its 
own accord. McCann’s “institutional advantages” and “more ca-
pable record”157
While a congressional version of the solution proposed in 
this Note would likely fix much of the problem this Note has 
identified, the risk of negative spillover effects from lobbying 
counsel against such a solution. Both the risk to the competi-
tive marketplace in individual team intellectual property and 
the overall status of antitrust law as applied to other business 
interests suggest that the Court should create such a rule with-
in its own limited and arguably special sports jurisprudence. 
 of Congress are not clear in a world where the 
courts are and will remain the primary arbiter of antitrust law 
in the United States, and can delineate a specific exemption 
with minimal fuss.  
  CONCLUSION   
In American Needle, the Supreme Court was asked to de-
termine whether thirty-two NFL teams, each licensing their 
individual and directly competitive intellectual property, could 
be considered a single entity for the purposes of collective li-
censing. The Court was well within both its jurisprudential 
bounds and the realm of common sense in striking down such 
an attempt to escape antitrust liability.  
At the same time, however, this decision should not be read 
in such a way to completely eliminate the League’s ability to be 
treated as a single economic actor when licensing its collective 
intellectual property as a competitive sports enterprise. Such 
an attempt to throw the baby out with the bathwater would not 
only risk balkanization of the League in its licensing agree-
ments and anti-competitive fiscal distributions, but it would al-
so risk the very existence of pro-consumer products such as in-
depth, fully licensed video games. By acknowledging the dis-
tinction between the teams that comprise the NFL and the 
NFL itself, courts can create a rule that fairly and adequately 
protects the consumer and the League. 
 
 
 157. Id. at 781. 
